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IN 'l' 1111~ 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2 831 
FRED "\V. RICHTER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ES-
TATE OF "WILLIAM CLYDE KNIGHTON, 
DECEASED, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
CORA L. SEA WELL, 1\.DMINISTRATRIX OF THE ES-
TATE OF ALVIN C. SE.AvVELL, DECEASED, 
Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR "\VRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Coitrt of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, F'red vV. Richter, Administrator of the -
estate of ·wmiam Clyde Knighton, Deceased, respectfully 
represents that he is aggrieved· by a final judgment entered 
against him by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, on- the 26th day of August, 1943, in the sum of Five 
Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars with interest from June 7, 1943, 
in an action at law in which your petitioner was the defend-
ant and Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of the estate of Al-
vin C. Seawell, Deceased, was the plaintiff. A transcript of 
the record accompanies this petition, together with the ex-
hibits introduced at the trial, which are certified bv the Clerk 
of said Court in accordance with law. ~ 
. This petition is adopted as the opening- brief and a copy 
hereof was delivered to .the attorney for the plaintiff on the 
~th day of December, 1943. Oral argument is requested. 
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For the sake of clarity and convenience, the parties will be 
referred to and treated as they respectively appeared in the 
Trial Court. 
2* *THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Plaintiff proceded against the defendant by Notice of Mo-
tion for Judgment in the amount of Ten Thousand ($10,-
000.00) Dollars. Defendant filed plea of general issue and 
issue was joined. The case was tried before a jury on June 
7, 1943, and a verdict in the amount of Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars was returned in favor of the plaintiff. 
Defendant made a motion to have the verdict set aside and 
final judgment entered up for the defendant, on the ground 
that there was no evidence to support same. This motion 
wa~ overruled on .August 26, 1943, and final judgment was en-
tered on the verdict on that date to which action of the Court, 
counsel for the defendant duly excepted. · 
THE FACTS. 
Plaintiff's decedent and defendant's decedent were killed 
while riding in the same automobile. The former was riding 
as a guest in the latter's car (R., p. 50). All that is known is 
that the parties left Norfolk sometime during the night of 
.August 21, 1941, or the early morning of Aug·ust 22, 1941. 
Sometime during the early morning of August 22, 1941, they 
were found dead in the car which had gone off the south side 
of the highway and crashed into a tree approximately twenty-
seven (27) feet from the highway (R., p. 21). There was a . 
drop or decline of about seven (7) feet from the surface or 
level of the road to the base or bottom of the tree (R., p. 21). 
The point at which the car went off the road was a mile or so 
west of Ivor, Virginia. 
The road on which the car had apparently been traveling 
is the main highway between Suffolk and Petersburg (Route 
460). The road at this point is hard surfaced, forty-two ( 42) 
feet wide, four la)le traffic, two lanes for westbound 
3* traffic and *two lanes for eastbound traffic. The road is 
level and straight in both directions from the point of 
the accident. 
No one knows at what time during the night or early morn-
ing the accident happened; there were no eyewitnesses to the 
accident. .At about 3 :30 A. M. some passerby observed the 
car off the road and up against the tree. State Police Officer 
Strang·e was called between 3 :30 and 4 :00 .A.. M. and he then 
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drove from his home at or near Smithfield, which is twenty-
two (22) miles from the scene of the accident (R., p. 17). He 
states that at the time he started for or arrived at the scene 
of the accident it was raining, but he could not say whether it 
was raining or had been raining at the time of the accident 
(R., p. 18). 
Police Officer Strange states that after he arrived at the 
scene of the accident he saw marks on the right shoulder of 
the highway going towards Richmond indicating that the 
right wheels of the car had gone off the highway and had 
traveled on the shoulder ( which is an inch or two I owe~. than 
the hard surface portion of the road (R., p. 25) for a distance 
of one hundred eighteen (118) strides (R., p. 11)~ then came 
up on the road, skidded and went seventy-four (74) strides 
from the point where it came back on the road and into a tree 
on its left side of the road as above mentioned. The car was 
, demolished. 
There is no testimony as to what, if any, traffic was on this 
section of the road at the time of or immediately before this 
accident happened. 
No one knows who was driving the car at the time the acci-
dent happened, however, Officer Strange said that judging 
from the position of the bodies in the car he would say de-
fendant's decedent was driving. 
4• •No one knows what caused the car to go off the road 
in the beginning, nor is there any positive evidence as to 
the speed of the car at the time it went off the road. 
The car was in good mechanical condition so far as the 
evidence shows. 
So far as the evidence shows the road was dry at the time 
of the accident. L. H. Pittman, a garage man, from Ivor, Vir-
ginia, who was a witness for the plaintiff, was among the first 
to arrive at the scene of the accident; he arrived there be-
fore Officer Strange arrived (R., p. 27). Pittman testified 
that when he arrived at the scene of the accident the road 
was dry (R., pp. 28-29). 
ERRORS ASSIGNED. 
The errors assigned are as follows : 
(1) The Court erred in refusing to sustain defendant's mo-
tion to strike plaintiff 'a evidence on the ground that she had 
not proved gross negligence on the part of def end ant's de-
cedent. 
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(2) The Court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict of 
the jury and enter up final judgment for the defendant on the 
ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove gross. negligence 
on the part of defendant's dooedent. 
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES. 
Since the same question is ~involved in each of the above 
Assig·nments of Error they will be treated below as one. 
From the evidence in the case the jury could find nothing 
but speed under most favorable conditions. ,v e have here a 
case in which the defendant's decedent was driving a car, 
which was in good mechanical condition, on a wide, straight 
and level road. So far as the affirmative evidence shows 
5* the weather was *favorable and there is no positive evi-
dence to show what, if any, traffic was on the road at 
the time of the accident. This Court has repeatedly held that , 
speed alone, especially under favorable conditions, is not gross 
negligence. We respectfully submit that so far as the evi-
dence of probative value shows we have the most favorable 
conditions ordinarily obtainable in which speed could be in-
dulged in. . 
,ve wish to point out that the speed limit on this road at 
the time of the accident in question was fifty-five (55) miles 
per hour. Plaintiff is basing her case on speed and in an 
attempt to show a high rate of speed she points to the dam-
age done to the car. When we bear in mind that the tree 
against which the car came to rest was only twenty-seven (27) 
feet (R., p. 21) from the road and between the road and 
the tree there. is a drop of seven (7) feet (H., p. 21), a car 
traveling at the rate of 55 miles per hour, which was the legal 
speed at that time, could have left the road and gone down 
this seven (7) foot decline and caused this damage to the car. 
In other words, the damage which was done to the car is con-
sistent with a speed of 55 miles per hour, and especially so,. 
when we consider the seven (7) foot decline above mentioned .. 
This Court has consistently held that it is not gross negli-
gence for one to inadvertently go off the road (Smith v. Tur-
ner, 178 Va. 172; 16 S. E. (2d) 370; Carroll v. Miller, 175 Va. 
H88; 9 S. E. (2d) 322: and Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30; 160 
S. E. 77). After defendant's de.cedent went off the road 
there is no evidence that wlmt he did thereafter was gross 
neg-li~ence (Driscoll v. Pagano, 48 N. E. (2d) 11 (l\fass.1 
1.943) ). The evidence sl1ows a slight drop between the high-
wav and shoulder. Our Court said in the case of Lipscomb 
v. O'Brien, 181 Va. 471, 25 S. E. (2d) 261, that it was negli-
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gence to apply brakes under the conditions there prevailing 
. and by the same token it was probably safer for defend-
6* ant's decedent *not to apply his brakes while running 
along the shoulder of the road, and when he :finally had 
an opportunity to turn his car hack on the road the difference 
between the level of the highway and shoulder caused his car 
to skid or swerve and he then went off the left side of the 
road. 
In the case of Driscoll v. Pagano, supra, the defendant was 
driving his car at a rather fast rate of speed on a wet and 
slippery street. While so driving he allowed his wheels to 
straddle a street car track, which track was raised slightly 
above the level of the street. Defendant apparently tried to 
get his wheels off the car track and all of a. sudden the car 
'' shot to the right'' and went off the road into a billboard 
estimated from one hundred (100) to one hundred fifty (150) 
yards away from the place where the car went off the tracks. 
The plaintiff, who was riding as a guest in defendant's car, 
brought suit for injuries received in the accident. She was 
not allowed to recover in the lower Court because the Court 
was of the opinion she had not proved gross negligence on 
the part of the defendant. She appealed the case to Massa-
chusetts Supreme ,J uclicial Court and the opinion of the lower 
Court was affirmed. In its opinion the Court said: 
'' At best, it is often exceedingly difficult to draw the line 
of distinction that exists between gross and ordinary negli-
g·ence. Yet the distinction is well established and must be 
observed, lest all negligence be gradually absorbed into the 
classification of gToss negligence. Duval v. Du.val, 307 l\Iass. 
524, 528 (9 C. O. H. Automobile Cases 662). '' 
* * * * 
"Ordinarilv no one element of cm1duct can be ruled to con-
stitute gToss iieg-lig·ence. Every act or omission entering into 
a· particular happening must be considered in connection with 
all the other circumstances before the whole can properly be 
]1eld to be an instance of gToss ne~lig·ence. Picarello v. Roda-
kis, 299 Mass. 33, _35. (9 C. C. H. A.utomobile Cases 662)." 
7* * * 
"It is true that" the road wns wet. but apart from the evi-
,:1,;nrP tlrnt tJiP h,.,,.1,: of t],n automobile was swaving and tlrnt 
there was a 'wobbling', tl1ere is nothing to indicate that np 
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to the time the defendant reached the car tracks he did not at 
all times have the automobile under control.'' 
* * * 
"It seems apparent from the record that the automobile 
skidded badly, and it could have been found that the defend-
ant attempted to get off the tracks. This may have been bad 
judgment in the circumstances. The automobile 'shot' to its 
right. The accident happened 'Quick as a flash'. The au-
tomobile started 'to sway and immediately swerved up over 
the sidewalk'. There was evidence that the automobile went 
a considerable dis.tance (see Adamin v. Messerlian, 292 Mass. 
~75) after it first left the car tracks. But there is no evidence 
that the defendant could have done anything to prevent this. 
We are of opinion that the evidence as to. what the defendant 
did or did not do up to the time he reached the car tracks does 
not warrant a :finding of gross negligence, and that what hap-
pened thereafter, together with what went on before, does 
not. In other words, putting all the factors together, while 
the case is close, a majority of the court is of opinion that 
there was no error on the part of the trial judge.'' 
From a review of the '' guest cases'' decided by this Court 
in which the "guest" was ·allowed to recover, we find .no case 
in which a recovery was allowed on speed alone. This Court 
has proceeded on the principle that no single violation of a 
statute constitutes gross negligence, but there must be a series 
of acts or omissions on the part of the host before be can be 
11,eld guilty of gross negligence. 
In the case of Poole v. Kelly, 162 Va. 279, 173 S. E. 537, 
this Court said : 
"We do not undertake to say that any certain speed is gross 
negligence where the road is wide and straight.'' 
Also in the case of Carroll v. Miller, 175 Va. 388, 9 S. E. 
(2d) 322, this Court, in commenting on speed in connection 
with gross negligence, said: 
'' Proper speed, as we have so often said, is to a largoe meas-
ure governed by conditions. We, by statute.~ have undertaken 
to fix a limit at 55 miles. A speed in ewce.r;;s of that may, 
8* 'UIJider certain "'conditions. be indul,qed in with safety; on 
the other hand, traffic a.nd road conditions may not only 
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niake that speed unsafe but any speed unsafe. C onilitions are 
conceivable in which any attempt to go ahead would be negli-
gence; from which it fotlows that speed alone can not sustain 
a recovery in, this case.'' 
As pointed out above, the speed limit at the time aud place 
of this accident was fifty~five (55) miles per hour. We have 
shown that conditions were favorable for speed. 
In the opinion last quoted from, it will be · seen that the. 
Court said that speed in excess of fifty-five ( 55) miles per 
ho~r under certain conditions might be indulged in with 
safety. In other words, such speed under proper condit~ons 
would not even be ordinary negligence, let alone gross negli-
gence. . . 
In the case of Carroll v. Miller, supra, the defendant host 
was driving his car at thirty-five (35) miles per hour in a 
twenty-five (25) mile per hour zone in the City of Norfolk, 
and he claims that a tire blew out and caused him to lose con-
trol of his car. There was some dispute as to whether the 
tire did blow out. In its opinion denying the plaintiff, who 
was a guest, a recovery, this Court said: 
"Conceding, for the sake of argument, that there was no 
blowout, all that we have left is speed. Plainly a speed of 
35 miles an hour over a good road in which there were no 
sharp curves and with which the driver was familiar is not 
grossly excessive, and the only evidence which we have of in .. 
attention is that the car ran off the road and over a 4 .. inch 
curb. 
''Code, section 2154(109), says in substance that a speed in 
excess of 25 miles an hour in a residential district is to be 
deemed prima f acie reckless driving, but plainly in itself it is 
not gross negligence.'" 
In the case of Drivmwright v. Walker, 167 Va. 307, 189 S. 
FL 332, this Court said: 
"The omission of one of the precautions required by the 
Virg-inia Statute might suggest under certain conditions only 
ordinary negligence.'' 
The Legislature has fixed a speed of twenty-five (25) miles 
per hour as a safe speed under proper conditions in a 
9'* residential *district of a citv and at the time of the ac-
cident in the case at bar the Legislature had fixed a speed 
of fiftv-five ( 55) miles per hour as a safe speed under proper 
conditions on the highways. Now this Court has said, as will 
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be seen from the part of the opinion quoted from the Carroll 
v. Miller case, that it is not gross negligence to exceed by ten 
(10) miles per hour the twenty-five (25) mile per hour spe·ed 
limit over a '' good road in which there were no sharp curves 
and with which the driver was famiilar''. By the same token 
for the sake of argument, even had defendant's decedent been 
exceeding the fifty-five (55) mile per hour speed limit by ten 
(10) miles per hour, this would not have been gross negli-
gence since he ·was traveling on a wide, straight, dry and level 
road. Had he been going sixty-five ( 65) miles per hour, this 
would have been prima f acie reckless driving pursuant to the 
provisions of section 2154 (109) Virg'inia Code, but as was 
said in the above opinion at page 401, this would not in itself 
have been gross negligence. 
In Y ouug v. Dyer, 161 Va. 434, 170 S. E. 737, the verdict 
of the jury wa~ set aside. There a car, running something 
around 50 miles an hour, was overturned when attempting to 
round a sharp right-hand curve. The driver was unfamiliar 
with the road and had been cautioned by tl1e plaintiff. It was 
held that no g·ross negligence was shown. In closing his opin-
ion, Chief Justice Campbell said: 
'' A mere failure to skillfully operate an automobile under 
all conditions, or to be alert ancl observant, and to act intel-
lig·ently and operate an automobile at a low rate of speed may,. 
or may not, be a failure to do what an ordinarily prudent 
person would have done under the circumstances, and thus 
amount to lack of ordinary care; but such lack of attention 
and diligence, or mere inadvertence, does not amount to 
wanton or reckless conduct, or constitute culpable negligence 
for which defendant would be responsible to an invited guest.'" 
This Court also held in the following cases that speed alone 
does not constitute gross negligence: 
Gale v. Wilbur, 163 Va. 211, 175 S. E. 739. 
Drmnwriglit v. Walker, 167 Va. 307, 189 S. E. 332. 
10* *In tl1e case of Bo.qgs v. Plybon., 157 Va. 30, 160 S. E. 
77, defendant, during nighttime~ drove his car too close 
to the edge of the road on a left-hand curve and went off the 
road. In his attempt to ~·et his car back on tbe road he lost 
control of it ancl an accident followed in whi~h the nlaintiff, 
who was a guest in tlie car, was in:iurecl. This Court did not 
allow the olaintiff to recover on the ~round that H was not 
. g-ross ne!!-lfo:ence on the nart of the defendant to allow the 
wheels of his car to go off the Imrd ~mrface of tI1e road. 
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The case of Grinstead v. 1.Vlayhew, 167 Va. 19; 187 S. K 515, 
is somewhat analogous to the case at bar in that no one saw 
the accident and no one knows how it happened. The driver, 
who was the host, was killed instantly and the plaintiff, along 
with the other passengers, was asleep. The plaintiff based 
his right to recover upon the allegation that the driver of 
the car drove his car at a too rapid rate of speed around a 
dangerous curve and while trying to round this curve at an 
excessive rate of speed, he collided with the left-hand side of a 
bridge or culvert, completely demolishing the automobile and 
injuring the plaintiff. 
The only evidence touching upon the question of negligence 
was that of three witnesses who saw the car about a mile and 
a quarter away from the scene of the accident and they said 
the car was at that time going between sixty (60) and seventy-
five (75) miles per hour. Shortly after this, the accident 
happened. 
In the above case, like the one at bar, no one alive knows 
how the accident happened, and _each car went off the road 
and was demolished. In the case above referred to this Court 
affirmed the judgment of the lower Court in favor of the de-· 
fendant and in its opinion said: 
11 $1 ,)(:,'While the rule of evidence in a civil case differs 
materially from that in a criminal case, it is neverthe-
less true that the rule in both cases requires proof that rests 
upon facts and proper inferences before there can be a con-
viction or a recovery of damaQ;es. Suspicion and presumption 
are not sufficient: The fact that an automobile was traveling· 
at an excessive rate of speed at a dista:nce of a mile and a 
quarter from the place of accident, while admissible on the 
ground of probative value, is not of itself sufficient to war-
rant the inference that ~mch excessive speed obtained at the 
time of the accident. The burden was upon the plaintiff to 
Rhow that Taylor waR irnilty of ~·ross negligence which was 
the nroxim;:ite cause of the accidPnt. This burden the nlain-
tiff has failed to carrv and the jurv was well warranted in 
finding- a verdict for the defendant.'' 
W c submit that in the case at bar there is even less evi-
bar there ·is no evidence tluit anyone saw defendant clece-
har tlrnre· is 'no evidence t1,f!t 11nvone saw defendimt's dece-
dent's car ::it anv time immedi::ifolv prior to the 3,-.cident, whiln 
i,1 thP. m1ot0d case tl1A1·e w::1 !=I ev1rl()nce of 1)robative valne thnt 
rfppprlpnf. '!-I r>;:t1• w.nc: ~·oino• nt a r~nid 01' eXCCSR1Y() 1•flte of c:q)Pprl 
!-.ltnrtly befo1·e the accident. If we eliminate this evidenr>c, 
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then, in each case we have the same mute evidence as the 
only evidence of. speed, namely, the demolition of each car. 
rrhis alone, as evidenced by the above decision, is not enough 
to warrant a :finding of gross negligence. Eveµ if the evi-
dence as to an excessive speed were clear and definite, this 
would still not be a case of gross negligence. As stated above, 
we have in this case every factor or condition which would 
make it safe for the driver to indulge in a speed in excess of 
fifty-five (55) miles per hour, which was the limit at the time 
of this accident (although there is no positive evidence that 
the speed was in excess of fifty-five (55) miles per hour). 
These favorable conditions being: a wide ( 42 feet), straight, 
smooth and level road, with little or no traffic so far as the 
evidence is concerned; also the car was in good mechanical 
condition so far as the evidence shows. The road was 
dry. 
12• •rn every '' guest case" decided by our Supreme Court 
in wl;iich the plaintiff has recover.edit will be found that 
the defendant had done more than speed on a wide straight 
road. Plaintiffs recovered in the cases of Stitbbs v. Parket·, 
°169 Va. 676, 192 S. E. 820, and Hackley v. Robey, 170 Va. 55, 
195 S. E. 689, but by referring· to these cases one will see that 
·they are readily distinguishable from the case at bar. Those 
accidents happened within the limits of a city where one could 
not drive safely at a high rate of speed. There were protests 
by tl1e g·uest against speed in one or. both of those cases and 
then\ were other elements of negligence not present in the case 
at bar. 
CONCLUSION. 
rt will be seen from the above th!ft the only evidence of neg-
lig·ence of any kind on the part of the defendant's decedent 
is speed, and that is only circumstantial. There is in the 
evidence or pleadings no intimation of any. act of negligence 
other than speed. As stated above, this Court has said on 
many occasions speed alone is not gross negligence. 
The mere fact that defendant's decedent permitted the car 
to go off the road is not gross nedigence (Smith v. Turner, 
Carr()ll v. Miller, and Bo.figs v. Plybon, supra). 
There is no evidence as to what caused the c.ar to go off 
the road in the beginning; any number of things might have 
caused this: e. ~-, the steering; gear might have given away; 
u tire might have blown out; one of the wheels might have hit 
an obstacle in the road causing the driver to lose control of 
the car; some other vehicle mig·ht have forced defendant de-
cedent's car off the road, or plaintiff's decedent in a fit of 
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madness mig·ht have, for some reason, grabbed or hit the 
steering· wheel, causing the car to go off the road. 
13• 8 As to spe·ed of the car-The accelerator might have 
become caught or fastened or even the plaintiff's dece-
dent mig·ht have suggested a test of the maximum speed of 
the car. 
Certainly there is just as much evidence that any one or 
more of the above things happened as there is evidence to show 
that defendant's decedent was guilty of gross negligence, 
which caused the accident. 
The jury can not guess as to what happened nor can they 
guess at some act or acts which constituted gross negligence 
on the part of defendant's decedent. It was incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence how 
and why the accident happened. 
In the case of Hawkins v. Beecham, 168 Va. 553, 191 S. E. 
640, this Court, in commenting upon the nature of e"ttid8nce 
necessary to make· out a eas~ of liability, said: 
"Negligence and an accident, however, do not make a case. 
As between them there must be causal connection. 'The evi-
dence tending to show causal connection must be sufficient 
to take the question out of the realm of mere conjecture, or 
speculation, and into the realm of legitimate inf erenoe, be/ ore 
a question of fact for su.bmissio,n, to the jury has been made 
out.' Virginian Railway CompO!liy v. Haley, 156 Va~ 350, 157 
S. E. 776, 786; Gunter's Adm'r v. Southern Ry. Co., 126 Va. 
565, 101 S. E. 885. 
"' Peradventure' is not enough. Washington, etc., Ry. v. 
Thompson., 136 Va. 597, 118 S. E. 76. 'Perhaps' is not enough. 
Vir.qinia Electric <t Power Co. v. Vellines, 162 Va. 671, 175 
S. E. 35." 
For the errors assigned, your petitionet prays that a writ 
of error be allowed in this case, and the judgment and ruling 
of the lower Court be reviewed and reversed and final judg-
ment be entered up for the defendant. 
This petition will be filed in the Office of the Clerk of this 
Court at Richmond, Virginia. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRESTON P. TAYLOR. 
PRESTON P. TAYLOR, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff in Error. 
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14* ~The undersigned counsel, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of .Appeals of Virginia, hereby certifies that in 
his opinion the judgment complained of in· the foregoing pe-
tition should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of .Appeals 
of Virg·inia. 
PRESTON P. TAYLOR. 
Received December 9, 1943. 
:M:. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
January 18, 1944. Writ of error awarded by the Court. No 
bond required. 
1VI. B. ,v. 
A. copy of the within Petition for ·writ of Error was deliv-
ered to and received by me this eighth day of December, 1943. 
VIRGINIA:-
REUBEN E. SP A.NDORFER, · 
Attorney for Deefndant in Error. 
RECORD 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at 
the Courthouse thereof, on the 26th day of August, in the 
year 1943. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit= In the Circuit 
Court aforesaid, on the 12th day of October, in the year 1942,. 
came the plaintiff Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of the Es:-
. tate of .Alvin C. Seawell, Deceased, and docketed her Notice 
of Motion for Judgment against the defendant, Fred W. 
Richter, .Administrator of the Estate of ·wmiam Clyde Knigh-
ton, Deceased, in the following words and figures, to-wit:. 
Virginia:-
In the Circ11it Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Cora L. Seawell, A.dminishatrix of tl1e Estate of Alvin C. 
Se~we11, Dec~ased, ,Plaintiff, 
v. 
Fred W. Richter, Administrator of tl1e Estate of· William 
Clyde Knighton, Deceased, Defendant. 
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NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To: Fred ,v. Richter, Administrator of the 
Estate of ·wmiam Clyde Knighton, Deceased. 
You are hereby notified that at 10 :00 a. m. of Friday, Au-
gust 21st, 1942, or as soon thereafter as she may be heard, 
Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of the Estate of Alvin C. 
Seawell, Decease4, will move the Judge of the Cir-
page 2 ~ cuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, at the 
Courthouse thereof, located in said City,, for a judg-
ment against you in the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) 
Dollars for damages for this, to-wit: 
That on the 23rd day of August, 1941, Alvin C. Seawell, 
her decedent, became a passenger in an automobile owned, 
operated and controlled by your decedent, viz.: "William Clyde 
Knighton, to be transported safely by the said William Clyde 
Knighton, from the City of Norfolk, Virginia, to the City of 
Baltimore, Maryland; that whilst in the course of transpor-
tation as aforesaid the said William Clyde Knighton did drive 
his automobile on Route 460, approximately ten miles west 
of Ivor, Virginia, in such a negligent, reckless and unlawful 
manner so as to caus~ his said automobile to leave the high-
way and run into an adjoining field for a considerable dis-
tance, crash into a tree with such force and violence as to 
totally demolish the said automobile and thereby inflict upon 
the said Alvin C. ·seawell mortal injuries from which he died 
on said 23rd day of August, 1941. 
·wherefore, Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of the Estate 
of Alvin 0. Seawell, deceased, institutes her notice of motion 
to recover judgment of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars 
against Fred 1N. Richter, Administrator of the Estate of Wil-
liam Clyde Knighton, deceased. 
August 4th, 1942. 
CORA T-'. SEA WELL, 
Administratrix of the Estate of 
Alvin 0. Seawell, deceased. 
By REUBEN E. SP ANDOH.FER, 
Her Attorney. 
pag·e. 3 ~ · And on the imme rlav. to-wtt: In the Circuit 
· Co'nrt aforesaid, on the 12th clay of October, in tlw 
year 194-2. 
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Upon the motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, it is ordered 
that this notice of motion be docketed. And thereupon came 
the parties, by counsel, and said defendant filed his plea of 
the general issue to which said plaintiff replied generally and 
issue is joined; and the further hearing is continued . 
The following is the Plea of the General Issue filed herein, 
by the defendant, by leave of the foregoing order: 
The said defendant, by his attc;>rney, comes and says that 
he is not guilty of the premises in this action laid to his charge, 
in manner and form as the plaintiff hath complained. And 
of this the said defendant puts himself upon the country. 
FRED W. RJCHTER, 
Administrator of the Estate of William 
Clyde Knighton, Deceased. 
By DREWRY & CROMWELL, 
His Attorneys~ 
DREWRY & CROMWELL, p. d. 
And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 7th day of June, in the year 1943. 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and 
page 4 ~ thereupon came a jury, to-wit: W. R. Cox, J. D. 
Staton, E. M. Stephens, I. C. Waugh, H. B. Cald-
well, E. E. Gardner and R. G. Holloman, who were sworn to 
well and truly try the issue joined, and having fully heard 
the evidence and argument of counsel returned its verdict in 
the following words and figures, to-wit: "We the jury find 
for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000.00. '' And thereupon 
said defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to set aside the 
verdict of the jury and grant him a new trial on the grounds 
that same is contrary to the law and the evidence; and the 
further hearing of which motion is continued. 
And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the day and year first hereinabove written, viz., on 
the 26th day of August, in the year 1943. 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and the mo-
tion for a new trial heretofore made herein in term time hav-
ing been fully heard and ma tu rely considered by the Court 
is this day, in vacatlon, overruled. Whereupon it is consid-
ered by the Court that said plaintiff recover against said de-
fendant the suin of Five Thousa1)d ($5,000~00) Dollars, with 
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legal interest thereon from th() 7th .day of June, in the year 
HJ43, till paid, together ~ith her costs about her suit in this 
behalf expended, to all of which said defendant, by counsel, 
duly excepted. And upon evidence this day heard it is fur-
ther ordered by the Uourt that out of .said recovery 
pag·e 5 } said administratrix shall pay to Cora L. Seawell, 
mother of the deceased, the sum of Twenty-two 
Hundred Fifty ($2,250.00) Dollars thereof; to Alton Clyde 
Seawell, father of the deceased, the sum of Twenty-two .Hun-
dred Fifty ($2,:d50.00) Dollars thereof; to Laverne S. Sea-
well, brother of the deceased, the sum of One Hundred 
($100.00) Dollars thereof; to Miles P. Seawell, brother of the 
deceased, the sum of One Hundred ( $100.00) Dollars ther.eof; 
to Sheila Richardson, sister of the deceased. the sum of One 
Hundred ($100.00) Dollars thereof; to Elwyn Seawell, brother 
of the deceased, the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars 
thereof; and to Peggy Seawell, sister of the deceased, the 
sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars, the remainder thereof. 
The following is the record in the above styled case: 
To: R. E. Spandorfer, Attorney for Cora L. Seawell, Admin-
istratrix of the Estate of Alvin C. Seawell, Deceased. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That at 9 :30 A. M., on Monday, 
October 18, 1943, the undersigned, Fred W. Richter, Admin-
istrator of the Estate of William Clyde Knighton, Deceased, 
shall present to the Judge of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, at its courtroom in the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia, my certificate of exception in your case in that Court 
recently pending against me, and in which judgment was re-
cently rendered, in order to have the said certificate of excep-
tion signed and made a part of the record in this 
page 6 }- case. 
Further take notice that on the same day at 10 :00 
A. M., the undersigned shall apply to the Clerk of said Court, 
in his office in Norfolk, Virginia, for a transcript of the record 
in this case, in order to apply for a writ of error. 
FRED W. RICHTER, 
Administrator of the Estate of William 
Clyde Knighton, Deceased. 
By PRESTON P. TAYLO;R,, Counsel. 
I hereby accept service of the above notice: 
REUBEN E. SP ANDORFER, 
Counsel for Plaintiff. 
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page 7 ~ Virginia:-
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of the estate of Alvin C. Sea-
well, Deceased,, 
1). 
Fred W. Richter, Administrator of the. estate of William 
Clyde Knighton, Deceased. 
RECORD .. 
Stenographic report of the testimony and other incidents 
of the trial of the above entitled cause, tried in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on June 7, 19"43, be-
f·ore the Hon. A. R. Haneke!, Judge, and jury; together with 
the motions and objections of tlle parties, the exhibits offered 
in evidence, the instructions to the jury, the rulings of the 
court, the exceptions of the parties, and other incidents of 
the trial of said cause. 
Appearances: l\fr. R. E. Spandorfer, Attorney for the 
plaintiff. M:r. Preston P. Taylor, Attorney for the defendant .. 
J. M. Knight, 
Shorthand Reporter, 
N9rfolk-Newport News, Va:. 
page 8 f Mr. Taylor: I would like to move for an exclusion 
of the witnesses, your Honor. 
Note: The witnesses were excluded, the jury was selected 
and ~worn, and opening statem~nts were made by l\fr. Span-
dorf er on behalf. of the plaintiff, and by 1Ir. Taylor on behalf 
of the defendant .. 
W. G. STRANGE, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Spandorf er: 
Q. You are State Officer W. G. Strangef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. And you are atta.ched to headqua~ers at Smithfield f 
,I_ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Does that embrace the district in and around Ivor 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the nig·ht of August 23, 1941, were you called to the 
scene of an accident on Highway 460 right near a colored 
school! 
A. I would like to ref er to my notes. 
Q. That is all right. 
A. What date did you say? 
Q. I have August 23. 
page 9 ~ A. My notes show 8/22 of 1941, at 3 :30 A. M. 
Q. That is after midnight? 
A. Yes. That is what I am going by,, my original notes, 
8/22/41, 3 :30 A. M. 
Q. There is no doubt about that. What time did you get 
this call? 
A. Between 3 :30, approximately between 3 :30 and 4 :00 
o'clock. 
Q. Between 3 :30 and 4 :00 o'clock¥ 
~ A. It was before daylight in the summer time. 
Q. What was the state of the weather at that time? 
Q. Did you go to the scene of the accident! 
A. Yes. 
A. According to my notes, the weather was rainy and 
cloudy. 
Q. Rainy and cloudy ·1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you see an automobile involved in an accident 
thereY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was the automobile? 
A. It was on the left side, Route 460 above Ivor, like you 
would be going from Suffolk to Petersburg or towards Rich-
mond. It was on the left-hand side of the road. 
Q. The left-hand side of the road going towards Peters-
burg? · 
page 10 ~ A. Yes, wtapped around a tree. , 
Q. What do you mean by wrapped around a tree T 
A. The side of the· car had gone into the tree like that ( in-
dicating) to t11e point that the ·front and back practically met. 
That is what I mean bv that. 
Q. The front and the back of the car had met 7 
.A. No ; I say partly met. It had gone around the tree in. 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
W. G. Strange. 
this angle, the side of the car, but didn't go in the tree like 
that ( in die a ting) . 
Q. "\Vas anybody in the carf 
A. Two men. 
Q. What was their condition, Mr. Strange! 
A. Both dead. 
Q. What were their relative positions in the car? 
A. William Clyde Knighton, Box 506, Essex., Maryland, was 
under the wheel. 
Q. William Clyde Knighton was under the wheel Y 
A .. Yes. Alvin Seawell of 1306 West 27th Street, Norfolk, 
Virginia, was on the right-hand side of the car. They both 
were wrapped up pretty close, tangled up against the car. 
Q. Did you investigate the cause of the accident as shown 
by any marksY 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is what I want to get. 
page 11 ~ A. After getting the bodies out and all, I trailed 
back, which an officer would do to find if these 
tracks left by the car-if these were the tracks left by the car 
that was in the accident. I went back towards Ivor and found 
where the car or the same track leading to this oar which, in 
my mind, was the track made by this car, had gone off the 
right-hand side of the highway in the dirt for a distance of 
118 strides or yards, a distance like th.at (indicating)., and I 
generally step it off by the yard stride. Then it swerved back 
to the left of the four lane road and came back on the road 
and went in a side skid for 74 more strides and bit tbe tree 
off the highway over a -slight fill and completely demolished 
the car practically. · 
Q. Completely demolished it Y 
A. P11actically completely demolished it beyond repair. 
Q. Did you see any skid marks resulting from the applica-
tion of brakes Y 
A. The marks I saw, from my opinion and from common 
observation of anybody, the rig_ht-hand marks were not skid 
marks, and I am positive that when the car came back to the. 
·road it looked like it skidded sideways, when it got back on 
the road to the left. When I sav a skid mark, it is an en-
tirely different mark from a brake mark. It is a wide flat 
mark. · 
Q. Different from a b1·ako markY 
page 12 ~ A. Yes~it is a wide mark, and kind of side skid-
ding. 
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Q. Mr. Strange, how long have you been accustomed to 
handling automobiles Y 
A. I have been with the State Department 7 years practi-
cally. It will be 7 years in July. 
Q. I suppose you knew cars long before thatY 
A. Yes. I was on the police force at Virginia Beach prior 
to that. · 
Q. · From what you saw, the impact with that tree, the de-
molished condition of the car, and the point from where this 
car started and then struck the tree which, according to your 
:figures, is 576 feet, what would you say was the best esti-
mate you-could give as to what speed that car was making at 
thattim.eY , 
Mr. Taylor: I object to that 
The Court: How in the world could be do any more than 
guess! 
Mr. Spandorfer: That is what I want. 
The Court: You can't try a case on guesses. 
Mr. Spandorfer: I have a very recent case, Bell v .. K emiey, 
in which the Court of Appeals has passed on that. 
The Court: Gentlemen, step out. 
Note : The jury retired. 
Mr. Spandorfer: Ii your Honor please, this 
page 13 ~ is a very recent case, the case of Bell v. Kenney, 
181 Va., page 24. In that accident four occupants 
were killed. There was a verdict and judgment and an ap-
peal to the higher court and the de~endants contended that the 
trial court erred in giving any instructions on the question of 
speed because there was no evidence tending to show that the 
truck was traveling at an illegal rate of speed. The court 
says: 
''It is true that the three occupants of the truck states "that 
thev were traveling from 20 to 35 miles an hour at the time of 
he impact and that no one contradicted them on this point. 
However, the condition of the vehicles, the distance they 
traveled from the point of impact before (.!oming to four occu-
pants of the car who were killed, are mute evidence of the ter-
rific force of the impact. A fair inference from these physical 
facts is that both vehicles were traveling at very high speed. 
• • • Four of the ocoopants of the coupe were instantly killed. 
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The head of one was severed· from the body,, the arm of an-
other was stripped from the shoulder. The bodies and their 
dismembered parts were found lying on or near the highway .. 
These physical facts, conceded to be true, are more eloquent 
and convincing as to the speed of the two vehicles than thee 
ipse dixit of any witness.'' 
I say for that reason this witness should be permitted to 
give to the jury the benefit of his experience of speeds, if he 
can. 
The Court: He can tell the condition of the 
page 14 ~ bodies and the c·ar .. As to the speed, that is for 
the jury to determine. 
Mr. Spandorfer: Can't he estimate the speed from the 
conditions f · 
The Court: He can't ·do that. 
Mr. Spandorfer: I want to except to the court's ruling, and 
want to show what his answer would be .. 
By Mr .. Spandorfer: 
Q. You may tell the court re.porte:r what your answer ls,. 
Mr. Strange. 
Mr. Taylor: We object to its going in. 
A. I would say the speed was between 70 and 80 miles an 
hour. That is only on common observation and experience,, 
together with investigations I have made. 
' Mr.. Spandorf er : I want to ask him tllis question in the 
presence of the jury: 
By Mr. Spandorf er: . . . ' 
Q. From the condition of the car and all the surrounding 
circumstances, including the point where the car went off the 
highway and came to its final rest, will you please tell. us 
whether the car was proceeding at a moderate rate of speed. 
or a high rate of speed l 
Mr. Spandorfer: That is a question, if' yom· Honor please,. 
. I would like to ask him before tl1e jury. 
page 15 ~ The Court : He can give his answer to the court 
reporter. 
Mr~ Spaudorfer: I except to the coult 's mling on that 
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particular question. You may answer that question, Mr. 
Strange. 
A. From all of the damage and everything that happened 
I still say it was traveling approximately 70 to 80 miles an 
hour. 
By :Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Without waiving my objection to the testimony offered 
by the plaintiff., I want to ask you whether or not a car going 
at 55 miles an hour would not have been damaged to the same 
extent that this one was if he had hit a tree? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Note : The jury returned. 
By :Mr. Spanclorfer: 
Q. Mr. Strange, I see you are looking at your notes. Those 
notes were made shortly after the investigation? 
A. Made during the investigation. 
Q. Were you there wlien the wrecking crew came along? 
A. I don't recall that, whether I was there or whether the 
wrecking truck was there ahead of me. I think they got to 
the scene before I did. I wouldn't say definitely. It has 
been quite awhile ago and it is not in my notes, and I could 
not answer it. 
page 16 ~ Q. Can you ten us how far the motor was thrown 
from this automobilet 
A. I could not tell you the exact distance. It was thrown 
from the chassis, but I don't know the exact distance. 
Q. It was thrown from the chassis? 
A. It was tbro-wn .completely out of the chassis. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Taylor: . 
Q. ,,r as there a clock on the dashboard of the car? 
A. I could not answer you. I clidn 't take that close ob-
servation. 
The Court: I didn't get the question. 
Mr. Taylor: I a~kecl him if there was a clock on the dash-
hoard of the car. J thought maybe that would fix the time 
of accident, by the time the clock stopped. 
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By '.Mr. Taylor: 
Q. You were not able to fix the time of the accident then Y 
A. Only by the approximate time that the report was 
turned in, the time I got the call. That is what I based the 
time of the accident on. 
Q. What time did you get the call! 
A. Between 3 :30 and 4 :00. 
pag·e 17 • Q. Between 3 :30 and 4 :00 Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Whattime did you get to the scene of the accident! , 
A. I could not tell you exactly. I had to put my clothes 
on at Smithfield after I got the call, and it is 22 miles there, 
and I .hurried as fast as I could. I didn't pull my watch 
out and check it. It was still before daylight good. I worked 
on the investigation and removed the bodies. 
Q. You g·ot the call between 3 :30 and 4 :00 and had to go . 
from Smithfield there, which is 22 miles? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That took you three quarters of an houri 
A. I would say around 30 minutes. 
Q. You don't know how long those people had been in this 
car before it was discovered? 
A. No. There was no witness to that effect. 
Q. They may have gone over there against this tree during 
the early part of the night, as far as you knowY 
Mr. Spandorfer: I object to that. 
Mr. Taylor: I say so far as be knows. 
A. No. I was on patrol on that road that night and I know 
they were not there before midnight. I think I would have 
·observed it if it had been there. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Would you necessarily have seen them if they had been 
there? 
page 18 * A. I think I would have observed a car over the 
bank. 
Q. Didn't you say on a prior occasion that when you reached 
the scene of the accident there the road was dry? 
A. I never stated. I said the weather was cloudy and 
1·ainy. 
Q. If it was raining and the accident had happened at least 
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· an hour before you got there, how could you discover and 
skid marks on the road? 
A. Very easily. They ·were as plain as the nose on my 
face. I went back and checked afterwards when the road was 
dry. · 
Q. If it had been raining ijnd the road had been very wet 
and the car had skidded across,, it would not have left any 
marks? 
A. Absolutely it would. 
Q. Was it a light rain or a heavy rain 7 
A. Drizzly rain. 
Q. You don't know whether it was raining at the time of 
the accident Y 
A. I could not say. It stopped while I was investigating. 
We left the bodies on the side of the road. It was not only 
drizzling, but the road was wet. ' 
Q. You don't lmow whether it was raining at the time of the 
accident? 
A. No. 
page 19} Q. This is a four lane highway? 
A. Yes, 42 feet wide. 
- Q. Two for westbound traffic and two for eastbound traffic t 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is very straight at that poinU 
A. Yes. 
Q. And perfectly level Y 
A. A few little dips, but nothing to worry about. It is 
rolling along out there, and just a few little minor dips. 
Q. Ordinarily at that time of night there is not very much 
traffic on the road? 
A. At that time, in 1941, there was a lot of traffic there. 
Today it is not. At that time it was quite heavy night and 
day. 
Q. You mean as compared with traffic there now Y 
.A. No. It is a heavily traveled highway .. 
Q. It was not as heavy after midnight as before t 
A. No, but there was a lot of truck traffic after midnight. 
Q. Of course, you don't know what traffic was on the road 
at that time? 
A. No, I don't. · 
Q. The tracks, I assume, that you saw on the 
pag·e 20 ~ shoulder were fresh tracks Y 
A. Yes, they led directly from where it happened 
to the car. 
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Q. This highway at that point is built up -a little bitt 
A. Where the car went off T 
Q. Yes. . 
-· '"1 
A. It has a-slig~ht fill there about the height of that door:, 
· I would say .. 
Q. The highway is about the height of that door higher than 
the base of that tree? · 
A. Yes. It goes down a slope. 
Q. How far is that tree from the highway! 
A. Very close. 
Q. How many feet'? 
A. I wouldn't say. I didn't measure it. 
Q. Can you approximate it, ten or fifteen feet r 
A. Let me check it up here. I can give it to you better. 
Q. How far is it with reference to the length of the car 
from the highway 1 
A. I would say approximately from here to that wall. I 
may be a few feet off. 
·Q. For the purpose of the record, let's see how far it is 
from the highway according to your estimation¥ 
A. I said approximately n{)W. 
page 21 ~ Q • .About seven strides, about 25 or 30 feet; is 
that about righU 
A. I would say that distance, just sitting here, from my 
observation, is close to 20 feet. 
Q. Suppose you measure it f 
A. You want me to step itf 
Q. Yes, approximately. 
A. Twenty-seven, according to my steps. 
Q. Now, Officer, also for the purpose of the record, about 
how high is that door, the top of that door there¥ 
A. I think that is six foot, thi::, door. 
Q. WhaU 
A. I would say it is six foot, this doo1·r 
Q. I am 6-feet 1-inch tall. I wish you would look at it and 
tell the jury for the record. TeH the jury how high it is. 
A. If you are 6-foot 1, it is close to 7. 
Q. After that car went off the road it would gain some mo-
mentum before 1Jitting the tree? 
A. I expect it would gain some probably. 
Q. I understand it was the right side of the car wI1ich went 
into the treef 
A. Yes. 
Q. The car bad evidently done some spinning around or 
turning around! 
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page 22 ~ A. Yes, had turned around. 
Q. And the right side of it, where it was struck 
by the tree, was pushed a considerable distance into the car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The tree was almost up against the steering wheel? 
A. The exact position I could not say definitely. I know 
it was about center-way. 
Q. If Mr. Knighton bad been sitting on the right side of 
that car, when the car hit the tree on its right-hand side, and 
the tree pushed into the car, it would naturally have pushed 
him over ag·ainst the wl1eel, wouldn't it t . 
A. They were both jammed up, Mister, just as close as they 
could evidently be, and the car jammed up so that we had 
to wrench it off to get them out., and Knighton was definitely, 
in my investigation, under the wheel. 
Q. If Mr. Knighton had been sitting over on the rig·ht-hand 
side of the car at the time of this accident, and it hit that 
tree as it did, and the tree came over into the car, it would 
naturally have pushed him over towards the steering wheel"? 
A. If be had been there. 
Q. Did you say he was there 1 
A. If he was on the right side, but he was not. 
Q. You don't know wl1at sides they were sitting on? 
A. I know they were riding in the car. 
Q. ,vhen the ca.r hit the tree it would have been 
page 23 ~ easy for the bodies to have been transposed? 
A. I don't see how it is possible. They were 
jammed up in it. 
Q. You just said that if :Mr. Knighton were sitting over 
on the rig·ht-hand side of the car and the car had struck up 
against the tree the way it did, the tree could easily have 
pushed him over under the steering wheel 1 
A. I beg your pardon. You have tried to g·et me to say 
that Mr. Knighton was on the right-hand side. I absolutely 
said he was on tbe left side. 
Q. I say if he had been sitting on the rig·ht-hand side at 
the time the car hit the tree, the tree would have pushed him 
over to where vou found him f 
A. No. ., 
Q. Why! 
A. Because after the man-both were wrapped in there to-
p:ether. I have tried to answer the question four different 
times, Mister, and as fairly as I can. 
Q. I understand, l\Ir. Strange, that you have no interest in 
this case, but I um trying., as is my duty, to get the facts be-
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fore the jury. Nobody saw the accident and nobody knows 
who was driving. I want to get this for the benefit of the 
jury. With the court's indulgence, I am going to ask you one 
more time. If Mr. Knighton had been sitting over on the 
right-hand side of the car at the time the car struck 
pag·e 24 ~ the tree, it could easily have pushed him to the 
left? 
Mr. Spandorfer: I object to that question. It is nothing 
but argument. 
The Court: It is nothing· but what? 
Mr. Spandorfer: It is an argumentative question. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. That is correct, is iU 
A. He would have been pushed towards the center, but not 
where I found him. 
Q. It would have pushed him from the right-hand side to 
the left-hand side, wouldn't it? 
A. No. It might have pushed him partly over there. 
Q. The car evidently hit the tree a terrific blow, didn't iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. If Mr. Knighton was sitting on the right-hand side of 
the car, when the car struck the tree, would not that have 
knocked him over on the left-hand side of tl1e car¥ , 
A. Mr. Knighton was under the wheel and the other man 
was laying down crushed in here. Mr. Knighton's body was 
under the wheel and the other man was towards the center, all 
jammed up. 
Q. You haven't answered the question. I say could not 
it have pushed him over on the left side when it hit the tree? 
A. It would have had to push him through the 
page 25 ~ other man because the other man was on the right 
side. 
Q. You think, if he were sitting on the right-band side of 
the car, the car hitting the tree like it did., he would have re-
mained on the right-band side? 
A. It might have possibly pushed him over some. 
A Juror : May I ask him a question Y 
The Court: Yes. 
By a Juror: 
Q. Were there dirt marks there t 
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A. Yes, where it left the road. 
Q. Before the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it Macadam or concrete road at that poinU 
A. The concrete is 11 foot, the concrete shoulder on each 
side, and then a 20 foot asphalt rock center. 
Q. Was the shoulder itself, where it started from, sloping; 
was there any drop there, or was it perfectly level? 
A. It was an inch or two. . 
Q.. Even if it was an inch drop the wheels would have 
trouble getting· back on again, more so than if it had been 
perfectly smooth? 
A. Yes. None are perfectly smooth. 
Q. The car didn't turn over, did it? 
A. No, just ski~ded. 
page 26 } L. H .. PITTMAN, · 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn., testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. State your name. 
A. L. H. Pittman.. 
Q. Yon live in Ivor, Virginia, .Mr. Pittman! 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time of this accident up on the highway you were 
working at Bracey's Garage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long· have you been in the automobile business Y 
A. About 15 years. 
Q. You are now employed by-
A. The Ivor Stave Company. 
Q. ,v ere you called to the scene of the crash at the time 
these two young men were killed 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were called from your home or garage? 
A. I was at hoine and there was a car stolen that night and 
they called me about 3 :00 o'clock and I went and got the car 
that was left with them, and when I was getting the wrecker 
gassed up two ladies came in and said there was another 
wreck up the road, and I told them I would go there as soon 
as I u·ot this car. 
'"' Q. That was approximately at what time Y 
page 27 ~ A. Before daylight, around 4 :00 or 4 :30 approxi-
mately. 
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Q. Did you get to the scene of this accident, where this 
car was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you go by yourself f 
A. Yes, on the wrecker. 
Q. ·what did you see when you got there? 
A. I thoug·ht there was two cars, to tell you the truth. 
. Q. You say you thought there were two cars f 
A. When I first saw it, yes. 
Q. Why did you think there were two cars f 
A. The car had hit the tree and snapped tl1e motor out of 
it, and the radiator and headlights was laying on this side, 
and the car was around the tree. The front part of the car 
was heading back to the highway., and had wrapped the other 
part of the car in the other part. . 
Q. How far was .the motor thrown from its chassis? 
A. I would say 20 feet, something like that, or 25 feet. 
Q. The motor was thrown 20 feet 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. ,v ere yon able to render any assistance whatever7 
A. No. 
Q. What did yon dof 
A. There was not anytl1ing to do until Mr. Strange got 
there. I waited until he got there and after he got 
page 28 r there and got us all straightened out we tried to get 
the car off. It was· hooked to the tree so tight we 
could not pull it off. It was hooked around the tree so tight 
I had to get the-to get to the center and pull it away from 
the tree. 
Q. Had to wrench it offf 
A. Yes. 
Q. How about this other gentleman wI10 was I1ere this morn-
ing, Mr. Clark, from Ivor; was he with you? 
A. Yes, he was out there. 
Q. Did he go with you Y. 
A. No. He came after that, after I got tllere. 
Q. He worked for Bracey's, too¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make any measurements there r 
A. No, sir. Mr. Strange made them .. 
Q. Mr. Strange made them¥ 
A. Yes, measured the skid marks on the road. 
Q. Could yon see them all right!' 
A. Yes, you could see them. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION~ 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. You say you could see the skid marks on the road Y , 
A. Yes. 
Q. The road must have been dry 1 
page 29 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
J.E. CLARK, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintif(, being· first duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. You are Mr. J.E. Clark? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You live in Ivor, Virginia Y 
·A. Yes. 
Q. By whom are you employed! 
A. Bracey 's Garage. 
Q. How long have you been in the automobile repair busi-
ness 1 
A. Around 10 years. 
By the Court : 
Q. How many did you say? 
.A. Ten years. 
By Mr. Spaudorfer: 
Q. Mr. Clark, were you called to the scene of this accident 
for these two young men who were killed in the car in August, 
1941? 
page 30 ~ A. After the men was removed. 
Q. I beg your pardon t 
A. After the men were taken out. 
Q. After the bodies had been removed Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How about the car; had the car been moved when you 
got there¥ 
A. Part of the car had been moved. 
Q. How about the body of the car? 
A. The body bad been moved. 
Q. The body of the car had been moved Y 
A. Yes, bad been moved. (J. "'\"'\7hat was the condition of the car? 
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A. Well, the body had been taken into our shop. The 
motor, the radiator, and fenders was still in the place where 
they were thrown from the car when it hit the tree. 
Q.· I didn't get the last part of your answer. 
A. The radiator, the motor, and the front fender was lay-
ing about 20 feet from the tree where the car hit, when I got 
there. · · 
Q. They were 20 feet away from the car? 
A. About 20 feet. I didn't measure·them, but right around 
20 feet. 
Q. Did you measure any distances that night Y 
A. No., I didn't. 
page 31 ~ Q. Did you see Mr. Strange measuring any dis-
tances? 
A. No, sir, I didn't. 
Q. The Police Officer Y 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q~ Did you see any skid marks? 
A. I saw a track. 
· Q. In other words, the car was completely demolished, was 
it noU 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you saw it Y 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Did you examine the body of the car at your shopT 
A. Yes, I did to a certain extent. 
Q. Yon got a g·ood look at it; didn't youY 
A. Yes. 
Q. What side of it was strnckY 
A. What side? 
Q. Yes. 
A. The right-hand door. 
Q. The right-hand door T 
A. Went into the right-hand door. 
Q. About opposite where a person would be sit-
page 32 ~ ting at the right of the driver? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. How far was the right side of that car pushed in to-
wards the steering wheel or the center of the car f 
A. I would say over half-,vay. 
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Q. If a person were sitting 011 the right-hand side o·f the 
car by that door, the impact necessarily would have pushed 
him over to the left, would it Y 
A. If one had been to the left it would have, yes. 
RE-DIRECT EXA:hilNATION. 
By Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. If it had pushed him over to the left, the man on the 
right, what would have happened to the man under the wheel 
then? 
A. He would be there., too. 
Q. He would still be under the wheel, would he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If he was not thrown out of the car 7 
A. Yes. 
page 33 r FRED W. RICHTER, 
the defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
Examined by Mr. Spandorf er: 
·Q. You are Mr. Fred "\V. Richter! 
A. That is right. 
Q. And yon practice law in the City of Norfolk! 
.A. Yes. 
Q. You have qualified as administrator of the estate of 
William Clyde Knighton, deceased Y · 
A. That is correct. 
Q. As administrator, did you take possession of his auto-
mobile which was in this accident Y 
A. I did. 
Q. What kind of car was it Y 
.A. 1941 Chevrolet Cabrolet. 
Q. Do you know when he bought it? 
.A. The car was purchased at Hyattesville, Maryland, on 
May 2, 1941. 
Q. What did you do with the car after yon- took possession 
of it as administrator? 
A. The car was taken to Bracey's Garage in Ivor after 
the accident, and I employed Tayloe 's Garage of this City to 
go up there and obtain the car and bring it to Norfolk, and 
the car was disposed of in Norfolk to a junk dealer by the 
name of Joynes for $50.00. 
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Q. It was practically demolished, was it f 
A. Yes. 
CORA L. SEA WELL., 
the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Spandorfer: . 
Q. Your name is Mrs. Cora L. Seawell Y 
.A.. That is right. 
Q. You have qualified as administratrix of the estate of 
Alvin C. Seawell, now deceased! 
A. Yes. 
Q. He was your son f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Seawell? 
A. At 1306 ·west 27th Street, Norfolk. 
Q. Mr. Seawell was your husband's child! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the father of the boy't 
A. Yes. 
Q. How old was Alvin when he died Y 
A. He was 22. He would have been 23 in September. 
Q. Talk so these gentlemen can hear you. He 
page 35 } would have been 23 the following month! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "Where did Alvin live¥ 
A. He lived with us. 
Q. That is his father and motherf 
A. That is right. 
Q. Where did he work? 
A. At the Norfolk Navy Yard, I g·uess you call it. It is in 
Portsmouth anyway. He worked at the Navy Yard up there. 
Q. What kind of job did he have? 
A. He was an apprentice machinist. 
Q. "What was his salary 7 
A. $25.00 or $30.00, according to tlie time he made per 
week. 
Q. They didn't make the money those days that the boys 
are making nowt 
A. No. 
Mr. Spandorfer: I want to offer this certificate of quali li-
cation, your Honor. 
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By Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. Did he go to school as a youngster 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 36 ~ Q. ·what school did he finish? 
A. You mean all schools? 
Q. No, not all. How about high school? 
A. He :finished at Maury High. 
Q. He graduated at Maury High¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Before going to the Navy Yard, what kind of work did 
he do? 
A. He was a paper boy. He worked, did his school work, 
and worked at garages and drug stores, too. 
Q. How long has he been a working boyf Wlmt age did he 
start working carrying papers f 
A. He started carrying papers when he was about 9 years 
old. 
Q. Did he contbme work 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And worked while going to school f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did he work, at stores, moving picture houses, or 
where? 
A. He worked at drug stores some and at D. P. Stores as a 
clerk. 
Q. As a clerk at the D. P. Stores f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was lie helpful around the house? 
page 37 ~ A. Oh, yes. 
Q. In what ways was he helpful, Mrs. Seawell? 
.A. ,Just anything that came up around the l1ome, mowing 
lawns, scrubbing floors or anything, and washing windows. 
Q. He washed windows? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he do with his moneyf I mean did he-
1\Ir. Taylor: I object to that. 
Mr. Spandorfer: I will qualify that. I think you are right. 
Q. Did he give you and his father any moneyf 
A. He gave it to me, yes. 
Q. "\Vas it a generous portion or a small portion? 
34 @llprgfile bom:t of ipp~~is or vifgi.hiri 
ci>,·a L. Seaiv~ti: 
A. It was generotis. " 
Q. Do you know how much he gave you each week out of his 
. pal: It was according t8 ~h~t he n1ade. iie aHv~ys gi~e me 
some. , .. , ... · ...... , . , ..... . 
Q. Suppose he made $7.5 .. 00, f hat. ~gt he g\ve you? 
A. Well, I will have to tell you that I don't know exactly. 
Q. What? .... 
A. I know he would give ~e. niost of it. 
Q. Can you tell us the amount? 
.. · , ..... . ~. N9.,, rca11,'t; .. , 1 , _. ·,.: •..• page 38 t Q. You can't teil tlie amount Y . . 
· . 'i ,. ,,·, A.. Not He always g·ave it to me and I paid his 
liills aria kept the test .. , . _. . . . . . 
. Q., H~ turn.~~ over all inoney to you and you paid th~ bilis 
tind kept the rest? 
A. That. ~s ri0 ·ht. . ·. Q. You diah 't keep ~iiy system of bookkeeping Y 
A. No, sir, I didn't keep any syste~. . .. . . 
Q. What was his standing· in tlie coriiriihrii ty? 
A. Everybody love.d_ lµm: . .. . . ,, . . '. . . . . , 
Q. Did he live witli you ancl :Nh. Seai~ell Elll the timeT 
A. ¥ es... . .• : . . . ... , , 'l . : . , , Q. Never hved elsewhere, did he T 
~: il~· aiw"tiys was a w'oridng boy, you say, f i·oin ~ years 
old? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he do on Sunday afternoons 1 
M~. Taylor: I object to that. ,v e have got to stop sdme~ 
where.. . 
The Court: On Sunday? . 
Mr. Spa_ndorfer: Yes~ Sunday afternoon. 
By Mr. Spa~9orf er: h . . . . . . . . Q. What were his abits Ori Sunday afternoons? 
page :fa} Mr. raylor: . I objeG,t. t.o that. . . . . __ The Court: We are riot interested in that. 
By l\fr. Spanciorf er: .. . . . . 
Q. Wash~. with YO\l <>rhis father on Sunday ~fternoons'l 
A. After he bought his car he always took us out. 
F. w. Richter, Adn/r; '1. 0. L. §e~#eti, Adm '.x: is 
odt=a .t. seauJezi. 
Q. Sunday 2was ydur aay with hiin ~ 
A. Yes. . . . Q~ nt& he belong to a chtirch, too' 
A. Yes. 
bitdss EriMiNlT10}1. 
By itr. T~yfor: _ .. 
Q. When he. bought: a car ,,h~. 9i4µ't. giv._e. yoµ_ ,all .. 9f 1:iis 
1Jl01}
1
ey,t : w~~ri}~ _lfou~pf the aufom.obile lie didn't give you 
all ?f ~1~ ~o~7Yj, cl1q_h~ ?: , . . ·... , . . : . , . ,. . -. ; . .-. . 
,J\: ~,<?, ii~ ch~n'~ gwe _1t a,It t~n~e~ I efp~c~ 4,e;gave .~t ~U fQ, ti\~ ~n9 I paid a certain amount each week he had to pay ;:~hJ iitr~t0!tJ~tlt t#~lt;~Jr:ttutW that he gave 
A. Yes. . . r . : 11_,, . __ ~ .. : 
_j: J;i,.itviilJ~(j~Tib~0t:t'he £1ways &rune to me ahd 
o·aye it to .me. . . 
o q. whii~ Ji~ ,v~s. wbi:king he did buy 8 car? 
A. Yes. . 
page 40 ~ Q. Xou were not dependent on him f.or your iive-
.. . . liliood? 
A.. No. 
By Mr. Spaiidorfer: 
Q. What was the condition of his health? 
A. Good. 
Mr. ,Sp_alidbtfer: ,1y e rest, if' your ,llonqr please~ 
Mr~ Taylor: Will your Honor let tlie jury step out t · 
Note: Tlie jury retired. 
l\fr. Tayior: . Your Ronor, i wiiit tB move to strike the 
p~~i.ilt\ff '~ ~victe11;ce. ,v.hick, .1 thin~, is ,qui!e nafu~al_ for one to 
make. m a case of this kind. Now, I thmk, of course, there 
mig·ht ~e __ some e~ide~~e 4ere_ which. would j:ustgy. t~~ jury 
ih. J:>e~i~v~ngJha t the . ~a r w~s. gqing _ at a. rather rapid speed_:_ 
The. Qqu,rt: Wh9 w~s ~riv\ni .. the: ~art . _ . 
M:r. 'r~y~or: . There 1s a gu~~t:i~m about that. 
The Court : Is this a guest case? 
Mr. Taylor: Yes. 
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The Court: Who is the guest! .Tl:iere is no evidence here 
to show that it was a guesU 
page 41 ~ Mr. Spandorfer: He was in the car. The evi-
dence shows that Mr. Knighton was behind the 
wheel of his own automobile. The evidence shows that from 
the State Officer. Mr. Knighton was behind the wheel. My 
decedent was a guest in the car. 
The Co\lrt: I don't know whethe1· it was a joint enterprise, 
or not. 
Mr. Spanclorfer: There is no evidence to show a joint en-
terprise. 
The Court: There is no evidence of anything. 
Mr. Taylor: The plaintiff's decedent claims that this man 
Seawell was going· to Baltimore with 1fr. Knighton and in 
Mr. Knighton's car. That is not in evidence, but he made 
that remark in his opening statement. :Mr. Knig·llton was the 
owner of the car, and Mr. Spandorf er said in his opening 
statement that he wanted to go to Baltimore and invited Mr .. 
Seawell, plaintiff's decedent, to go with I1im. 
The Court: There is no evidence of that. 
Mr. Spandorfer: There is no evidence of that, and it 
doesn tt effect this case. I believe there was some evidence 
here about Baltimore, but it has nothing to do with the case. 
The Court: I would like to know who the parties 
page 42 ~ were. 
1\fr. Taylor: "'\Vhile the evidence is silent on it, I 
think it is pretty well agreed that this man Seawell was a 
guest in Mr. Knigllton 's car. Seawell is the plaintiff and 
Knighton is the defendant. The plaintiff is represented by 
Mr. Spal].dorfer. 
At the present time, for the purpose of this motion, we wliI 
assume that Knig·hton was driving, however, I think we will 
put on some ev_idence later to raise a very serious question 
as to whether I1e ,,ras driving·. The only evidence here that 
he was driving is tl1e officer's testimony. He says tllat wI1en 
he came to the car Seawell was in the bottom of the car and 
Knighton was on top of him. It mig11t be that when the rfo;ht 
Hide or corner of the car hit the tree it naturally pushed 
Knigl1ton to.wards tlle steering· wheel. It is not at all clear 
as to wlJO was driving·, and I tbinl, we can put on some evi-
de,nce wbicb will raise a serious question as to whether or 
not Knfo-hton was actuallv driving;. For the purpose of my 
motion, however, I am willing· to assume that Knip;hton was 
driving·. Starting off with that assumption, tlmt he was driv-
ing, we have a case here in which it is sl1own by t11e evidence 
F. W. Richter, Adm 'r, v. C. L. Seawell, Adm 'x 3 l 
tliat the automobile was in good mechanical condi-
page 43 ~ tion, with the plaintiff's decedent in there as a 
guest. The evidence is that they were going west 
on this main highway between Suffolk and Petersburg and 
that after they bad gotten to a point on the road about one 
and a half miles west of Ivor the car went off the road on 
the rig·ht-hand side and traveled off on the shoulder of the 
road three hundred and some feet, and it got back· on the 
road, and when it got back it made a side skid and then went 
across the road seventy some more strides down an embank-
ment and into a tree which was some twenty feet away from 
the road. Now, on the question of speed, the officer testified 
that the tree is down below the level of the road a distance 
across this room. If the car had been going at 55 miles an 
hour, which was the legal speed limit at that time, .. and went 
off the road it would· naturally have gained momentum going 
down the hill and ag·ainst the tree. Even if we assume that 
the car was going more than 55 miles an hour, there is not 
one scintilla of evidence in this case to indicate that tbe de-
fendant was grossly negligent. Our c~urt has held in any 
number of cases as to what constitutes gross negligence.· 
There has always had to be something· else in the case other 
than speed where they have held that it is gross 
page 44 ~ neglig·encc. In the Robey case, where a collision 
arose in Richmond several years ago, a young· fel-
low was driving a car in the city limits out Broad Street 
which is a very wide thoroughfare, and he was familiar with 
the street, and as he reached the Broad Street Bridge the 
road came to a bottle-neck and tapered off. The evidence 
shows tlrnt this boy entered that bottle-neck and was traveling 
so fast that l1e could not make tl1e turn and went up on the 
curb and hit a tree and went down and hit another tree. The 
evidence showed that it was in a citv where vou would not 
expect a car to be g·oing so fast, and the evidence also showed 
that there WRR a protest on the part of plaintiff's decedent. 
which we don't have in this case. In the Rohev case vou have· 
a street in the citv. a protest on the part of ti1e nassenirer in 
the .car, nncl in addition to that the man was familiar with the 
place. Instead of driving· nropPrlv he went straig·ht on and 
went over the curb. Another late case on the subject of 
speed is Bell v. J( M1/nev. an<l tlv:iv had also in that case a pro-
test on the part of pfaintiff'~ denedent. He lmd just passed 
a car in front of his somn. ~O feet and had made a slulrp 1eft-
hnnd turn And went off tl1e ro::id. and in that case he went 
· t1lon'.l' n 4 foot embankment on the rig·bt-hand ~idP 
page 45 ~ of the rond. WP,nt dow,, tJie road :inst abo11t as f::ir. 
I believe, as this car went across the road~ and bit 
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a tree. In that case there was not any wide road 1ike we have 
in this case, and he was also trying· to pass a car. In the 
case of Bell v. Kenney it is said,•' We don't undertake to say 
that any certain speed is gross negligence where the road is 
wide and straight''. Under certain conditions, for instance, 
where a man encounters a lot of traf.tic on a narrow curved 
road, he can be gTossly neg·ligent driving at even 20 miles an 
hour, but on a road like t\ns a· speed of 100 miles an hour in 
the absence of some factor which might make it dangerous, 
does not constitute gross negligence. 
The Court: Doesn't that leave it to the jury? 
Mr. Taylor: No, sir. If there bad been some evidence here 
that this road was cuning or that there was a lot of traffic 
on the road, or that this man was trying to pass a car, it 
would be a question for the jury to pass on. In this case we 
have a wide, straight, level road, and most ideal conditions 
under which a person could who wanted to speed. It is a four-
lane hig·hway, two for traffic going westbound and two for 
traffic going eastbound. It is forty some feet wide. 
page 46 r The speed limit at that time was 55 miles an hour, 
in 1941. The offic~r said it was raining·. He said 
he didn't know whether it was raining at the time of the ac-
cident, or not. The other witness said that when he went 
there the road was dry. I asked him if he cquld see the skid 
marks easily and he said yes, and I asked him if the road was 
dry aud he said yes. There is no evidence here to show that 
it was raining at the time of the accident. So far as the evi-
dence in this case goes, we have this accident happening at an 
early hour in the morning on a road which the officer said 
ordinarily carried right much traffic, but he doesn't know 
whether there was any traffic on it at the time of the acci-
dent. There is no evidence here to show or to indicate any 
condition which would militate against speed or anything to 
make it unsafe for traffic to move fast. 
One of the latest cases involving· the question of speed is 
reported in 175 Va., Carroll v. Miller. T1=ie cause of action 
arose in Norfolk, and incidentally the case was tried by Judge 
Spindle who was sititng for your Honor. Judge Spindle in 
that case was reversed. It was shown by the evidence that 
the defendant was driving 45 or 50 miles an hour, 
page 47 ~ was going around a curve and he lost control of 
the car and went up, I think, and hit a tree. He 
claimed a tire went flat, but the jury found against him. 
,Judge Spindle affirmed the verdict of the jury and the Court 
of Appeals reversed him saying that there was not anything 
in there except the question of speed. 
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The court in its opinion said in part: 
'' Proper speed, as we have so often said, is to a large 
measure governed by conditions. vVe, by sta.tute, have un-
dertaken to fix a limit at 55 miles. A speed in excess of that 
may, under certain conditions, be indulged in with safety; on 
the other hand, traffic and road conditions not o.nly make that 
speed unsde, but any speed unsafe. Conditions are conceiv-
able in which any attempt to go ahead would be negligence; 
from which it follows that speed alone cannot sustain a re-
covery in this case. '' 
What else is there in this case with the e~ception of speed, 
and as to that the jt1ry has got to gvess. Somebody may have 
nm him off the road, his accel~rator m~y have gotten, stuck, 
and he may not have been able to stop, or his brakea may 
have gone wrong. The jury can't be left to g11ess as to what 
happened. There was a case that. went up from this court, 
an action aga.inst the Norfolk & Southern, which yom· Honor 
will probably recall, where a Norfolk Southern locomotive 
was going across a trestle and a man was killed. 
page 48 ~ Nobody saw the accident and nobody knew any-
thing about it. Our Court of Appeals held that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, that it had not been 
shown why or how the accident happened and that the jury 
simply could not be left to guess at random. . 
In another case, Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. 
Heath, 103 Va., page 64, the court said this : 
"The party who affirms negligence must establish it by 
nroof sufficient to satisfy reasonable and well-balance minds. 
The evidence must show more than a probability of a negligent 
act. An inference cannot be drawn from a presumption, but 
must be founded upon some fact legally established. This 
court has repeatedly held that when liability depends upon 
carelessness or fa ult of a person, or his agents, the right of 
recovery depends upon the same being shown by competent 
evidence, and it is incumbent upon such a. plaintiff to furnish 
evidence to show how and whv the accident occurred.,....,..some 
fact or facts by which it can be determined by the jury, and 
not be left entirely to conjecture, guess, or random judg-
ment, upon mere supposition, without a single known fact.'' 
As I say, starting off with the premise that our court has 
said that speed in excess of 55 miles an hour under proper 
conditions can be indulged in with safety, and that excessive 
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Mrs. Cora L. Seawell. 
speed itself is not gross negligence, I submit that there is 
not sufficient evidence in this case to go to the jury. Our 
courts have also said that mere indifference or 
page 49 ~ failure to skillfully operate an automobile is not 
gross negligence. In this case we have the most 
ideal conditions under which anybody could exceed the speed 
limit even if there was evidence here that there was an excess 
of the speed limit, that it was a dry level road and there is 
no evidence that there was any traffic on it at that time. That 
is all we have. There is certainly not sufficient evidence to 
let the jury pass upon it. In order for the jury to bring in a 
verdict against this defendant in this case. they have got to 
guess as to who was driving the car. They have also got to 
guess as to whether the speed was in excess of the legal rate 
of 55 miles an hour and that he was driving in such a manner 
as to make him guilty of. gross negligence. There is abso-
lutely nothing· in this case upon w11icI1 to base a verdict ex-
cept speed alone. I submit, therefore, that it should not be 
left to the jury. . 
The Court: I think I had better leave it to tlle jury. It is 
very slim, of course. 
M::r. Taylor: We except to the action of the court in over-
ruling· the motion to strike tI1e evidence on tlle grounds stated 
in my motion. 
Note : The jury returned. 
page 50 ~ Mr. Taylor: I want to caII Mrs. Seawell as an 
a~lverse witness. 
MRS. CORA L. SEA WELL, 
the plaintiff, called as an adverse .witness, testified as follows-: 
Examined by Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Mrs . .Seawell, your son, I believe you said, was' riding 
with 1\fr. Knigliton at the time of tllis acciclentf 
A. Yes. 
Q. _You don't know wJ10 was driving or anything about it r 
A. No. 
0. "Mr. Seawell. your 80n, was not workinp; for Mr. 
Knfa:hton, was I1e, 
A. No. 
Q. He was just riding· with him ns fl friend or g·ne~t fo 
· Baltimore f 
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Dr. S. 0. Bennett. 
A. Yes, so I understood. 
Q. He was not on any business for Mr. Knighton¥ 
A. WhaU 
Q. He was not on any business for l\Ir. Knighto~? 
A. Mr. Knighton was g·oing on his own business. 
Q. Your son was just riding with him as a friend 
page 51 ~ or g·uest 1/ 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. Mrs. Seawell, there is only one question I want to ask 
you. Why did your son not work on that particular day i 
A. Because he had been sick. He had a: tooth drawn that 
morning, a wisdom tooth drawn that:ruorning .. 
By Mr. Taylor·: . _ 
. Q. Of course, you don't know who was driving ·the car at 
the time of the accident? · · 
A. No. 
DR. S. 0. BENNETT, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
Examined by i\fr. Taylor: 
Q. You are Dr. S. 0. Bennett? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A general practitioner in Norfolk, are you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have offices in the Wainwright Building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During· the summer of 1941 did you have oc-. 
page 52 ~ casion to treat or operate on :M:r. William Knighton, 
who was later killed in an automobile accidenU 
A. I attended llim and assisted in an operation. I didn't 
do the ol)erating. 
Q. Did he liave a major or minor operation? 
A. A major operation. 
Q. What was the· nature of it t 
A. The oneration was g·fmerallv what we call exploratory. 
0. An abdominal operation, was it not? 
A. Yes. . 
0. Diel vo11 have t0 make a fairly large incision 1 
A.' ,Ve ·made a fairly long incision in his upper abdomen. 
w· e examined the organs, the pancreas, and other organs. 
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Q. You suspected cancer, did you noU 
A. Possibly, before the operation. 
Q. Was he following that operation in a critical or serious 
condition! 
A. He was, both before and affter the operation. 
Q. Do you have your notes showing on what date he was 
operated on? 
A. He was operated on on the 14th of July, 1941. 
Q. In what hospital? 
A. Norfolk General Hospital. 
Q. Do you know what date he was discharged? 
pag·e 53 ~ A. He was discharged July 31, 1941. 
Q. Of course, the stitches had been taken out 
before he left the hospital T 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how many stitches they took? 
A. No, I wouldn't know that. The external stitches were 
probably about 9 or 10, I suppose. 
Q. Had he been discharg·ed by you at the time of his death? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not you cautioned him about 
driving an automobile on a long trip! 
Mr. Spandorfer: I want to object to that. 
The Court: Why do you object Y · 
Mr. Spandorfer: The evidence in this case is that Mr. 
Knighton was the driver of this car, that he owned, operated, 
and controlled it, and there has. been no affidavit filed here 
denying it. 
The Court: Is there a question as to who operated it Y 
Mr. Spandorfer: We allege that he was the owner and op-
• era tor and there has been no affidavit filed denying it. 
The Court: He is not suing the owner. 
Mr. Spandorfer: We are suing the owner. 
page 54 ~ The "Court: Knighton was not operating it for . 
somebody else? · 
Mr. Spandorf er: No, sir,· but they could not deny that 
Knighton was the driver or the operator of this car until they 
filed an affidavit. 
The Court: I overrule the objection. 
Mr . .Spandorfer: I want to except, and further want to ex-
cept to the question Mr. Taylor asked the Doctor.· · 
The Court: I overrule your objection. 
Mr. Spandorfer: We except. 
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Mrs. G. M. Bryant. 
A. I could not answer that question yes or no, because I 
haven't got the record. I don't remember that detail. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Knowing· this man's condition, would you have consid-
ered it safe for him to have driven a car from Norfolk: to 
Baltimore on the 21st of August following -his discharge from 
the hospital? 
A. I would have considered it inadvisable for him to drive. 
Q. Do you think he was physically able to drive? 
A. Possibly so, but he should not have done it. 
Q. Would he have had to drive the car with any discomfort 
to himself T · 
A. He probably would have been considerably 
page 55 } fatigued, yes. . 
MRS. G. :M:. BRYANT, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by :M:r. Taylor: 
Q. What is your name? 
A. :M:rs. Gladys M. Bryant. . 
Q. Mrs. Bryant, I believe you live in the City of Norfolk? 
A. That is right. 
Q. You have lived here how long? 
A. Twelve years. 
Q. You are a sister, I believe, of Mr. Knighton, who was 
killed in August, 1941, in an automobile accident at Ivor, Vir· 
ginia? 
A. That is true. 
Q. When was the last time that you saw your brother? 
· A. Fridav afternoon. 
Q. Was that on the afternoon of the night on which the 
accident happened? 
A. That is right. 
pag-e 56 ~ 0. What, if anything, did he tell yon about going 
to Baltimore and under what conditions he would 
go? 
A. When he left home? 
0. Yes. · 
A. The last thing he said to me was, '' Sis, if I can get 
~omeone to help me drive or drive for me, I am going to Bal· 
timore tonight.'' 
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lJ.frs~ G. M. Bryant. 
. Q. He said to help him or to drive for him T 
A. To help him or drive, to help him drive or drive, that 
he was going to Baltimore that night .. 
Q. And that is. the last time you saw him t 
A. Yes, that is the last time I saw him. 
CROSS EXAl\HNATION. 
By Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. He said if he got someone to help him drive f That was 
your first response 1 
A. If he got somebody to-he was going to Baltimore that 
night if he could get someone to help him or drive for him. 
Q. To help him? 
A. Or drive for him .. 
Q. Or drive for him T 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
page 57 ~ Q. W'hat was his condition¥ Had he fully recov-
ered from his operation! 
A. No, sir .. 
By Mr. Spandorfer: 
Q. Why was he going to Baltimore, l\f rs. Bryant 7 
A. He was going to Baltimore to see something about being 
transferred to another job or something. 
Mr. Taylor: That is our case, your Honor. I would like 
to have Mr. 8pandorf er agree~ if he will, that this accident 
happened in August, 1941, before the speed limit was reduced,. 
and I would like for him, if he will, to agree that the speed 
limit on that particular road at that point was 55 miles per 
liour. Is that agreeablet · · 
Mr. Spandorf er: If you s·ay so, I am not going to try to 
contradict you. 
The Court: The Code will settle that. · 
l\Ir. Taylor: It is stipulated between counsel that the speed 
limit on tl1e section of the road at which this ac-
page 58 ~ cident happened at the time of the accident ,vas ·55 
miles an hour. · · 
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The Court: That is what the Code says? 
Mr. Taylor: Yes, sir. In some places there are slow signs. 
The Court: I understand it happened a mile and a halt west 
of Ivor in the open country. 
Mr. Taylor: Yes, sir. That is all we have. 
Mr. Spandorfer: We rest, your Honor. 
Note : The jury retired. 
Mr. Taylor: I desire to renew my motion to strike the 
plaintiff's evidence on the grounds heretofore stated, which 
is overruled, and to which action of the court I except. 
page 59 ~ INSTRUCTIONS. 
l\Ir. Taylor: The defendant objects and excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in giving any instructions on behalf of the 
plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff has not made out a 
case of gross negligence against the defendant. 
Plaintiff's Instmction No. I ( Granted) : 
''The Court instructs the jury that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove her case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.'' 
Plaintiff's Instruction No. II (Gra;nted): 
"The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence of 
negligence on the part of Alvin C. Seawell, so that the matter 
of contributory negligence is eliminated from this case." 
Mr. Taylor: The defendant objects and excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in g-ranting Plaintiff's Instruction No. II 
on the grounds that since there was no evidence one way or 
the other as to contributory neg·lig·ence of plaintiff's dece-. 
dent, there is no necessitv of' 1ariving· the instruction, nor af-
firmatively calling· tl1e attention of the jury to a 
pnge 60 ~ possible lack of contributory negligence. 
.·T! .~,,-... •· ........ : .. i ..... ~·. ",~ .... ~!-,. . •, ~ .. - . ·-
"The Court instructs the jury i,f tb~y. beli~_ve f1.9m.th~.ijv\~ 
deuce that at th~, tim.e .. 9f, the_ .accid¢nt ,r~spltilig iii. th~. d<t~th 
of Alvin C. Seawell.thf;1U1e wa~ ~ glle&t. pa~~enge:rJn. tlie!~ar, 
that William Clyde Kuig·hton operated the said car in a 
g-rossly negligent manner or in a '!il~-qtfl~? ~a~t~p q.is~eg~.~d 
of the safety of the person of his ~asse:hger; ana that said 
gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard of the safety 
q~ ·::P.i~ .. P~1ss~g·w~-. .w~s, th~ pr,o~hnat~ ca q~e. .of:_ the, J(Cfjde:1Jt _~e-
s11Jtwg \l\.,~h~. qe~t~.~<;>LSe~w~~p.,_ {p~Y.. shall find their verdict 
for the. plamhff agamst the def enda:nt. '' 
Plaintiff's Instruct"ion No. X (Granted): 
'' r1w Cot:Jrt. iµ~tr~Gts t4e .ju.rr th3:t Jf they -fi~d £or the 
. 't'!iri,tiff' hi a '~e_1·§si-_n_ 1t!. th~ ~plliaa··· ~~ Hf. 'l~ ·, hre hot 1ffii_uit~d_ td th·e, ~~f µJJ 18sg qf ~lh:~i~1t bf .W1.~ d~,~~.a,;~[ ~~~ ~H~f njay ~~s¢~ij 
s~ch stlill li§ t6 thew ~f, ~eJ/11Jij11t!~;iid.~p~tr).o?.lH1t~t,~>.~Jl w~ 
circumtances df tile casl cons1aermg the loss of l:hs care, at-
tention, and society to bis family, together with such sum as 
they may deem fair anc,l. just by way _of .. solace_ and. eomfo.tt 
to them for the sorrow and mental anguish occasioned by his 
death.'' 
''The pour~ instfU~.mll~M· .ivr~it~f}~ bef~~·~}~~J?lajn~\ff.P~l) 
recover m this case, she must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, each and every one of the following things: 
1. Th.ht at the time of the.. accident in question WillUim 
Knigltto~ w~s .clrivln&"; the .?ar,. . . ~- . . . ,· -
2. That Wilham Knighton was anvmg the car ma grossly 
11eg·ligent manner and in such a careless and reckless manner 
a~ to-.e.:v.d~ncp ~-wjlbl, wanton or utter disregard of the safety 
· f · i' 1 • 1 Hff, ·· a · .. a· , ·i-o p ai-n l , . ~ .. ece1 en . , . . . 1 : h . , ~ . . . . . .1 .- . 
.,.p- .'t,R-4-ti- eti~t.~rb.~~s He&·li~·.epc~,,}i;.}ny, as orltlinea ab8v~ 
was t.he.pr8~11iUiJ~,cal!~e.9f tpe.a1~~~p.~nt., 'i=i • . 1 • . l! .; ·~ 
, 1 .The b?1rwt fnrtJirr l'1,strt1~~s th~ :1~1i:1:JH~t ~f,. aft~r. ;'1~a~i~~ 
all of t~e ,e~~~n~~ 1iJ t~~ c~se~ yq1\ p~,ie~~ 1t }~Wt, ~:s prob~h!y 
that one or. fnP,f:~.,o{J4.e. rJwv~ .. t~mg:s: 'Y~S, Iio.ttrpe, !"\S it,)S 
probable that tliey were true, then you must find for the de-
fendant.'' 
F. W; -i.H&iite1~; itl1lli'r; "'· e. t: S~iwM1; .!cim'x 47 
n~/bim£1a' J 1M~trllHio1i Ji o: 11 ~afciiiiietij = 
... '~~ rp.~. CP,J.I~t Jn~~{up,t~ 1 t]l.~. j~ry. t:µat .Pl:1iif j~ ~fi ~~t~9.~': ~nd h~~ 1?gpt,t9. .. i:ei9v:er .. r~·.Qfl1, the.d~fe,n44P~Js .... l·\s_e,<;l ,Q).l ~µd.4~~ 
D~1lq.~n.~J;tP9.D; ... ~;G .»,rgv,mgl·, _qy, ~ .. -m~~p9_11.de,:r~1we .. 9f tJit.~Vil~ 
d~rtp~, .. t:µ~t J.{p~gp.tpµ w~~ g~ilty.J>f~·~~ws il~glige~c~~ or g_uj~ty 
of a wilful -~nd .w,P!~:P.,.~\SJ;~g~~d8f t~e, s3:f~.tr 19:f Ji~s p~~~~µ-
·: •• <·· .. ~.: g~1~J!·;t1-4.,~u~h gro,s8:}J.~ghg~l}.ceJ?r w~lf1.1I ~pg 'Y~t9~ 
page 62 } d1~g~~~rd ,9.f t4~- )3~~~ty 9_f ;41§ P~-~~.w;1ger., .~~ ;µiy 
1- •. \r··~ .. Pf~Q~~t~ly ,c_9,t.tt.r.i~1_1thc;l t,d, th~ ... M.~iQ~J?.t,. aµ,p. yp;µ 
~r.~.J Jt11~~·-~n~tr:uc ~~ .iliJtt.){µ1g·. ~<:>TI 1~~P.r9l?W:~<1,.tP _Pe • .fr~~ 
!~~m.~it~/~t!tfM11P~;~~li~:~1 )!~:~i~ .:11t~Ila?l. 
~~{oi:~. 10!?-~ -~~11:~.nnct f qr~.,th~ P.h;t.1.nt1! '.J~t~~n~t ~ t; e .'. ~~f~~cl-
at1~ !_QUj.ipv~t •. ~r.~lJl~d. ·~!:·a m::~p,ong.~1;~AQer,Qf }li~ evide?~e, 
ape], i!P(.b7 W.r~ , .. ~peQ.til.at1.n,j gv.~~s-, ,cqnleQ~ur~.,. ~W ,pr_qbal).1l~lf of ~}:1eg·J~ge11. act, t4t1.~ t .- ~ .. de~~µq~~ti .. w~_~,. gmHy .):~f g:n>~.§ 
negligence or a wanton and wilful disregard of tlje, .. ~~e.tY.. 
of his passenger, and that such action on the part of Knighton 
proximately contributed to the accident.'' 
l\,ir. 1S.pandorfer: . Counsel .for. the ,plaintiff objec~.a an,d ~;x-· c~fjts to ttie ao.H6n . f tlie ~otiH irl krlititiiig Defenclarlt 's In-
strll~tiorl Nt. iI ori t~e gr<luiit=i that it is sihi°ply it }~staterli~iit 
of -«rliat is coiiHiiH~cl iii his Iiistrhhticlii NC>. I. 
.de/e1iaa1l-t; s i;istri1cticni No. Hi i Gratiteaj ; 
'-.'The,Cour;t,instructs the jury that inadv:ertauce or a Iri.ere 
fai]ur~ to skil}ful}y. -operate_ an. automobile .under S:11_ COI)W.-
tiorls doe~ ndt. constitute gross:;negligelice;. a}1d you. ~re. ~,lso 
instructed that excessive speea;. under certain .Qr favorabl~ 
co:rlditio:ns~. SliCp as 0~ a _wiae straight-.road; is not in .aJid ,Of 
-. . itself. g.ross rlegligehce, arid you are fur.the-t .in:-
page 63 } structed that should yon believe from the evidence 
. . i1' Jpi~ .. ~f~e}b~t 1{n,~~top w~~ dr}Ji~~--~~e p,ar . . ft 
the time of the accident at a rate of speed m excess of tlie 
speed limit, then in determinin<>' whether or not this was gross 
nr~Ii~Wi&~; .. ?-ii, r:r~. to ~Ii,k~.l~if~i CQ~S.~~~bt~!o~. It~~'. ~i~th ~~~ 
s,~Ff~~J~ -~f tlie ,~o~~; /~e 9ue:--~;tt~n .~f w~efli~~r o~ ~oJ. the r?~d 
was stra1~~t or curvea at flr near the pomt where the car 
,v~M- <>ff ,.i11eJcr-'a, or &fi:v 01:hJr cortaition~. siiowh ii:v. the evi~ 
deifoe affectiii' iHij o~~ratloii of th~ c&r; and if th¢ e~dehce 
dlscfos~s no ciiiditioii ,vliicli would nec~ssaHly tir proolioly 
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render excessive speed dangerous, then such speed would not, 
under the circumstances, constitute gross negligence.'' 
Mr. Spandorfer: Counsel for the plaintiff objects and ex-
cepts to the action of the court in granting Defendant's In-
struction No. 3 on the ground that it states as a matter of 
fact that excessive speed under certain or favorable condi-
tions is not in and of itself gross negligence. Counsel for 
the plaintiff contends that excessive speed may or may not 
be gross negligence, depending upon the circumstances, and 
that the court should not have told the jury that excessive 
speed is not gross negligence, and further the court should 
not have limited the question of gross neg·ligence merely to 
the width and surface of the road, or whether it 
page 64 ~ was straight or curved, but should have told the 
jury in view of all the circumstances then surround-
ing the operation of the e~r they should conclude for them-
selves whether such excessive speed was or was not gross 
negligence. 
Plaintiff's Instruction No. III (Refused): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that it is neg·ligenee to op-
erate an automobile upon a highway without maintaining· a 
proper lookout; or to operate it without keeping it under rea-
sonably complete control; or to operate it recklessly or at a 
speed or in a manner so as t9 endanger life, limb, or property 
irrespective of any speed limits allowed by law.'' 
Mr. Spandorfer: Counsel for the plaintiff objects and ex-
cepts to the action of the court in· refusing to grant his In-
struction No. III for the reason that it is•a correct explanation 
of the law of the duties mentioned therein on the part of 
Knighton that were required of him by the law and which 
would show negligence if he violated any of the said duties. 
page 65 ~ Plaintiff's Instriwtion. No. TIT (Refiised): 
"The Court instructs the jury· that under the evidence of 
this ca·sc William Clyde Knighton is considered to be the 
driver of the car at the Hme of the accident resulting· in the 
death of Alvin C. Seawell, and if tirn jury further believes 
that at the time of the said accident vVilliam Clyde Knighton 
operated tl1e said car in a grossly negligent manner or in a 
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willful and wanton disregard of the safety of the person of 
~s passei1g.er; . a_nd that said gross negligence or willful and 
w:ant_o~ .disregard ,of. the. s~f ety of µis . passeng·er wa~ th~ 
proximate cause of the accident resulting in the death of 
Alvin C. Seawell, then they shall nud their verdict for the 
plaintiff against the defendant.'' 
. Mr. Spandorfer: Counsel for the plaintiff objoots ~nd ex-
cepts .to the action of the court in refusing to give his In-
struction No. IV for the reason that the notice of motion al-
leges that Mr. Knig·hton did own, drive, operate, and control 
the automobile inyolv.ed in this accident, and no affidavit of 
such .denial was filed by the defendant as is required by the 
ftatute, hence.Mr. Knighton is to be considered as the driver 
of the car in the .eyes of the law. 
page 66 ~ Plaintiff's lnstru.ction No. 8-a (Refused): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that they are warranted in 
inferring the cause or the accident and the speed that the 
car was making from the physical facts and the surrounding 
circmristances. '' 
Mr. Spandorfer: Counsel fo1\ the plaintiff objects and ex-
cepts to the action of the court in refusing to grant his In-
struction No. 8-a for the reason that the cas.es.of Hackley v. 
Robey, 170 Va., pag-e 55; Stubbs v. Parker, 169 Va., page 676, 
both state that inf~n·cnces of speed and causes of accident 
may be drawn from the physfo:al facts. Also Bell v. Kinney in 
181 Va., pag·e 24, practically states the same thing with refer-
ence to speed. 
Plaintiff's Instritdion No. viz. (Refitsed): 
, , The ·coµr't instructs the. jury that although they may be .. 
it~ve. fr~~} ~he evide7:1:ce tha.t. an~ ~i~g:le,. a~t of, n·eglig:ence of 
the driver of the c~r m question, 1f you l?eheve thete was any, 
was nQt gross neglfo;'ence fo itself, yet if you furthei· believe frpm ±he evidence that Knig·hton was guilty of ·more than one 
apt of negligence. anq that the flOIDbined force of ~aid acts 
of negligenc'e un.der the. circumstances of the case ~aken to-
ge.tlier as a ,vhole 'amounfad to gross negli~encel' . then tl1e 
.·~· . pl~intiff is entitled to r~cover !1.gainst th~ cr~fend-
pa2;e 67 ~ ant if t~ev further heheve said gros~ ne.gfoi:ence 
. , , nroxi:matPly C8USed the COlliSioD 8ll0 death fo the f1!a~nt1ff's decedent.,, . 
50 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Mr. Spandorfer: Counsel for the plaintiff objects and ex-
cepts to the action of the court in refusing to give instruction 
No. VIII for the reason that it is in accordance with the law 
as laid clown in- similar cases. 
Defendant's Instruction No. IV (Refused): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence in this case that this was an unavoidable accident, 
then you must find for the defendant.'' 
page 68 ~ The jury returned to the courtroom. 
The Court read the instructions to the jury. 
Counsel argued the case, and the jury retired to consider 
its verdict and returned with the following: 
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000~00. 
(S) I. C. °"TAUGH, Foreman." 
Mr. Taylor: If your Honor please, we make a motion to 
set aside the verdict on the g-round that the same is contrary 
to the law and the evidence. · 
( This motion was continued.) 
page 69 ~ JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, A. R. Hanckcl, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, who presided over the trial of the case 
of Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of the estate of Alvin 
C. Seawell, Deceased, v. Fred W. Richter, Administrator of 
the estate of William Clyde Knighton, Deceased, in said court 
on June 7, 1943, certify that the. foregoing is a true and cor-
rect transcript of the evidence adduced and of the exhibit of-
fered in evidence, the objections to the evidence, or any part 
thereof, offered, admitted, rejected or stricken out; and the 
instructions granted and amended; the rulings of the court; 
the exceptions of the parties; and other incidents of the trial 
of said case. 
I further certify that this certificate ha's been tendered to 
and signed by me within the time prescribed by Code Section 
6252 for tendering and ~igning bills of exceptions, and that 
reasonable notice in writing has been given to the attorney 
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for the plaintiff of the time and place at which said certificate 
has been tendered. · 
Given under my hand this 18th day of October~ 1943. 
page 70 ~ 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Vfrginia. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Robertson Haneke!, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, do certify that the fore going report 
of the testimony, instructions, exceptions, and other incidents 
of the trial of the case of Cora L. Seawell, Administratrix of 
the estate of Alvin C. Seawell, Deceased, v. Fred W. Richter, 
Administrator of the estate of William Clyde Knighton, De-
ceased, was lodged and :filed with me as Clerk of the said 
court on the 18th day of October, 1943. 
ROBERTSON HANCKEL, Clerk. 
By T. A. W. GRAY, D. C. . 
Deputy Clerk. 
page 71 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Robertson Haneke!, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a 
true transcript of the record in the case of Cora L. Seawell, 
Administratrix of the estate of Alvin C. Seawell, deceased, v. 
Fred vV. Richter, Administrator of the estate of William Clyde 
Knig·hton, Deceased, lately pending in the said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due notice 
thereof in writing- and of the intention of the defendant to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of error 
and supersedea,s to the judgment therein. 
ROBERTSON HANCKEL, Clerk. 
By T. A. W. GR,AY, 
Deputy Clerk. 
A copy Teste : 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, Judge. 
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EX. NO. 1. 
Virginia: 
In the 'Clerk ;s "Office of the Circuit Coui·t of the City of 
Norfolk, on the 3rd day of August, 1942. 
,. (-'., • ' • ·.- •••.•• : • • • ('" T •• t r· :. ' 
I, Cecil M. ~oper_tso~ .Olerl~, of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, in the State of Virginia, do certify that it 
appears from the record.s. of. ~e said . Cpnrt, on file in _my 
office, that Cora L. Seawell duly qualified on the 3rd day of 
4µgust,, H)42, as. A¢lmini~tratrix of the estate ot Alvin C. Sea-
~e:Q, deG~.sed,. ~~ duly exec~te~ . and ac~owledged a . bond 
a·~ p_:r;~~criQed by law,. in.. th~. pe:nalty of $1.00.QO, concµtioned 
a~~ording_ to law, without surety, the law requiring none of 
her as such . 
. • ........ i . . •· .l • . , • 
.. . ~iveA undel' JilY hand. ancl the ~eal of said Court, the day 
and the year first herein above written. 
(Seal) . CECIL J\L .I.tOBERTSON, Clerk. 
By W. R~ HANCKEL, D. C . 
. ' 
A Copy-Teste : 
.. 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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